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Abstract:        This paper tests some existing theories developed over the past 25 years on corporate 
demand for insurance. Using a unique dataset of 1,809 large U.S. corporations it provides the 
first empirical analysis that compares corporate demand for standard property insurance and 
for catastrophe coverage (here, terrorism).  We find that larger companies are more likely to 
have some catastrophe coverage. Corporate demand for catastrophe insurance is found to be 
more price inelastic than insurance for non-catastrophe risks. This result differs from the 
findings on individual demand for insurance. The terrorism insurance premium per dollar of 
coverage is twice as high in the New York Metropolitan area than in the rest of the U.S. Yet 
the price elasticity of the demand for terrorism insurance is half in this area relative to the rest 
of the country.  
 
 
Mots clés : Risque terroriste – Assurance commerciale –  Financement des catastrophes  
 
Key Words : Terrorism –  Corporate demand for insurance – Catastrophe financing – Empirical analysis 
 
Classification JEL: D21 (Firm Behavior); D81 (Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and 
Uncertainty); G22 (Insurance; Insurance Companies); H56 (National Security and 
War) 
 
                                                          
1 We are indebted to John Rand at Marsh MacLennan for many fruitful discussions and for sharing with us the data that were 
used in this paper. Financial support from the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes, the Chair AXA and Chair 
EDF at the Ecole Polytechnique (France) is gratefully acknowledged.  
2 The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, Huntsman Hall 556, Philadelphia, PA 19102, USA; 
Emails: erwannmk@wharton.upenn.edu  
3 Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, Route de Saclay, 91128 Palaiseau, France.  Email: erwann.michel-
kerjan@polytechnique.edu 
4  University of Innsbruk - Universitätsstraße 15, A - 6020 Innsbruck, Austria. Email: paul.raschky@uibk.ac.at  
5 The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, Huntsman Hall 556, Philadelphia, PA 19102, USA; 
Emails: kunreuther@wharton.upenn.edu  
1 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Today there are nearly 37 million small and large companies doing business in the 
United States. They employ directly, or indirectly through suppliers abroad, several 
hundred million people. These corporations operate within a complex environment and 
face a large number of risks that can seriously challenge their future, or even lead to 
bankruptcy. A better understanding as to how these companies protect themselves against 
those risks is thus of prime importance.  
Focusing on decisions made by large corporations, this article investigates 
insurance as a natural means for financial protection.  Here we are interested in whether 
corporate demand for insurance differs with the nature of the risks that corporations face. 
One specific question this empirical paper infers in this context is whether large 
corporations treat the risk of a truly catastrophe risk differently than non-catastrophe 
risk.1 Somewhat surprisingly, these two questions have received little attention in 
empirical microeconomics.  
In the past few years, there has been a growing interest in studying the economics 
of catastrophe risks and catastrophe risk financing, as illustrated by the publication of the 
2007 Economic Report of the President prepared by the Council of Economic Advisors. 
For the first time ever, the CEA annual report devoted an entire chapter to the economics 
of catastrophe risk insurance, (White House, 2007). As the report states, “insurance plays 
a vital role in America’s economy by helping households and businesses manage risks. 
(…) Insuring economic losses arising from large-scale natural and manmade catastrophes 
such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks poses special challenges for the 
insurance industry and for Federal and State governments.” 
This growing interest in catastrophes should not come as a surprise if one 
considers the twenty most costly insured natural and man-made catastrophes in the world 
over the last 38 years (1970-2007). Indeed, half of them occurred since 2001, nine of 
these ten in the United States.     
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 hereafter) were the most 
devastating of all catastrophes until Hurricane Katrina occurred. These attacks inflicted 
insured losses of nearly $35 billion, nearly twice as much as those from Hurricane 
Andrew, the previous world record holder. Furthermore, the claims from the 9/11 attacks 
                                                 
1 We know this to be the case for individuals. Many people tend to underinsure against catastrophe risks 
even though this is specifically the type of risk one might expect them to seek protection against. See 
Kunreuther (1978) for early work on this very question and Kunreuther, Meyer and Michel-Kerjan 
(forthcoming) for a review of the behavioral factors that contribute to these individual decisions. For 
instance, it might come as a surprised to some that today only 12 percent of the population of California 
living in areas at high risk for earthquake has purchased quake insurance. Likewise, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reported that 41 percent of homes damaged by the 2005 
hurricanes were uninsured or underinsured, even after the 4 hurricanes that devastated Florida the previous 
year. (GAO, 2007). 
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were almost exclusively made by corporations located in or next to the World Trade 
Center (WTC). 
  
A closer look at figures on terrorism reveals that the nature of this threat has 
radically changed over the past two decades. One of the main features of this 
transformation is that corporations are now much more likely to become targets for 
international terrorist organizations which seek to inflict mass casualties and economic 
disruption to Western countries. For instance, according to the US Department of State, 
in 2000, 178 out of 206 U.S. targets attacked were businesses (over 80 percent); in 2001, 
204 out of 228 (90 percent). (U.S. Department of State, 2004).2  
 In this context, this article investigates corporate demand for terrorism insurance 
and analyzes how decisions made by firms in this regard differ from their decisions on 
standard property coverage.3   
Undertaking this analysis today makes sense for at least two reasons. First, before 
9/11 terrorism was included as an unnamed peril in most commercial insurance contracts 
in the United States. Quite surprisingly indeed, even after the first Al Qaeda attack 
against the World Trade Center in 1993, insurers had not excluded this risk from their 
policies—nor had they specifically priced it.  (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2004).  
Second, the shock of 9/11 led insurers and reinsurers to stop covering this risk 
almost everywhere or, when they did, charge a prohibitive price for it. In the United 
States, by early 2002, 45 states permitted insurance companies to exclude terrorism from 
their corporate policies,4 leading to a call for some type of federal intervention (U.S. 
Congress Joint Economic Committee, 2002). A joint public-private program, TRIA 
(Terrorism Risk Insurance Act), was established at the end of 2002, thereby creating a 
new insurance market in the United States.5  Six years have passed and the market is now 
mature enough that we can undertake microeconomic analyses based on a substantive 
data collection. 
 
 
                                                 
2  CIA director, George Tenet, suggested this behavior in his prophetic unclassified testimony of February 
7, 2001 (prior to 9/11) when he said: “As we have increased security around government and military 
facilities, terrorists are seeking out "softer" targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties”. (CIA, 
2001). Such a soft target strategy has since been explicitly admitted by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Al 
Qaeda chief of military operations, who was arrested in March 2003. (Woo, 2004).  NB: Such data are not 
publicly reported anymore after 2003.  
3 This type of analysis is not easy because quite often one can access data only of those who have 
purchased coverage, but not those who decided not to buy insurance. This generally makes the 
determination of market penetration difficult, and the calculus of price elasticity somewhat biased (see 
Chapter 10 in Wharton Risk Center (2008) for an analysis of residential demand for hurricane risk coverage 
in the U.S.).  We have overcome this limitation here thanks to access to a complete set of data provided to 
us by Marsh. 
4 Workers’ compensation insurance policies cover occupational injuries without regard to the peril that 
caused the injury 
5 Several European countries also created (France and Germany, for instance) or reorganized (e.g. U.K) 
their terrorism insurance market based on a risk-sharing arrangement between the private sector of 
insurance and the national government (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2005). 
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Organization of the Paper and Key Findings 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of studies on 
economics of national security, and corporate demand for insurance, the two fields to 
which this paper is contributing. Section 3 presents background information about the 
development of the U.S. terrorism insurance market pre- and post-September 11, 2001. It 
also discusses key features of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) under which this 
market operates today. During the first few months after the passage of TRIA less than 25 
percent of large U.S. firms bought some type of terrorism insurance. We find that since 
that time the market penetration has continuously increased to reach a plateau in 2005 at 
about 60 percent for these large firms where it remains today.  
Section 4 describes the dataset, explains the empirical strategy, then presents and 
discusses the results of our econometric analysis. We perform a number of empirical 
estimations: We first  look at the effect of corporate characteristics on the decision for 
terrorism insurance. Contrary to what one might have expected --that large companies are 
typically more diversified, have easier access to capital and therefore are less likely to 
buy insurance-- we find that, other things being equal, large firms in our sample are more 
likely to buy terrorism insurance than smaller companies. We also find that firms who 
have purchased earthquake insurance, which is typically not required as a condition for a 
mortgage, are actually less likely to buy terrorism insurance. We then estimate and 
compare price elasticities of standard property and terrorism coverage and also test 
whether these elasticities vary by the  size of a company We find that corporate 
demand for terrorism insurance is less price-elastic than demand for property coverage. 
The same 10 percent increase in price will reduce quantity of property coverage 
purchased on average by 1.99 percent where it would reduce the quantity of terrorism 
coverage by only 1.18 percent. The range of price elasticities is somewhat stable across 
firms of different sizes, even though demand is slightly more inelastic for the largest 
firms in our sample.  
After undertaking this analysis we examine a possible “New York effect”: 
Firms headquartered in the New York metropolitan area behave in a different way 
than those headquarters in other part of the country. We find that price for terrorism 
insurance is actually two times higher in the New York metro area than it is in the rest of 
the country. Still, the price elasticity of the demand for terrorism insurance is about half 
in New York Metro of what it is in the rest of the country (-0.073 versus  -0.130). One 
explanation is that these companies see this location as being a more prominent target 
than the rest of the country thus have a higher willingness to pay for terrorism insurance. 
     Section 5 concludes with some implications for federal intervention into 
catastrophe markets and policy implication for the U.S. terrorism insurance market 
specifically. 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
This analysis developed in this paper provides insights for two fields of research in 
economics: the economics of national security (how financial protection of commercial 
enterprises will help speed in the recovery process in the aftermath of a terrorist attack) 
and corporate decision-making regarding insurance.  
 
2.1 Economics of national security and government intervention in terrorism 
insurance markets 
Not surprising, the field of economics of national and international security has 
been growing following the 9/11 attacks and the start of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.6 Looking specifically at terrorism risk, the literature in this field can be subdivided 
into three major strands, the third of which this paper contributes to.  
The first one deals with the causes and origins of terrorism by investigating the 
nature of terrorism CLAARIFY , the formation of terrorist movements, their behavior 
(Hoffman, 1988, Stern, 2003, Sandler and Enders, 2004), whether and, if so, how 
terrorism and economic factors such as poverty, education are related (e.g. Krueger and 
Maleckova, 2003; Blomberg et al., 2004; Enders and Sandler, 2006; Mirza and Verdier, 
2008) as well as the possible effectiveness of counter-terrorism activities (e.g. Lapan and 
Sandler, 1988; Lee, 1988; Frey and Luechinger, 2004; Sandler and Enders, 2004).     
The second area of research deals with the consequences of terrorism on society. 
For instance, several empirical studies in economics have been conducted on the effects 
of terrorism on a variety of indicators such as GDP (Tavares, 2004), life satisfaction (e.g. 
Frey et al., 2007), companies’ stock value (Abadie, 2003; Doherty et al., 2003; Brown at 
al., 2004), foreign direct investment (Enders et al., 2006), vacancy rate in business offices 
of large cities (Abadie and Dermisi, forthcoming) or tourism activities (Drakos and 
Kutan, 2003).  
The third strand of literature, in which this paper fits, has its focus on financial 
protection against the consequences of terrorism attacks. Most of the papers published on 
this third question so far are policy-oriented contributions which examine the role of the 
public and private sectors in providing financial coverage against terrorism (Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan, 2004; Smetters, 2004; Jaffee and Russell, 2005; Jaffee, 2005). Other 
contributions look more specifically at how risk is shared between different stakeholders 
under the current public-private TRIA program in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Treasury, 
2005; Congressional Budget Office, 2005; Wharton Risk Center, 2005; Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan, 2006; 2007), and under programs established in other countries (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office. 2005; OECD. 2005; Michel-Kerjan and Pedell. 2005, 
2006). Most contributions in the literature on terrorism insurance thus focus on 
governmental intervention and/or the supply side of the market (i.e. the insurers).  
                                                 
6 For instance, Martin Feldstein established the NBER Group on Economics of National Security in 2006.  
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Quite surprisingly, the demand side has received only minor attention in the 
economic literature. Do more firms buy terrorism coverage today than just after TRIA 
was enacted? How does size of a company is likely to affect its decision to buy or not to 
buy terrorism insurance?  What’s the price of terrorism insurance today? How does it 
vary by location and size of firm? What can we infer on how these firms perceived the 
likelihood to be victims of a terrorist attack? What’s the price elasticity of the demand 
function? How does it vary by location and size of firms?   This paper tries to shed some 
light on these issues.   
In doing so, this paper also contributes to a better understanding of corporate 
decision-making regarding financial protection against catastrophic risk, using terrorism 
as an illustrative example of catastrophes potentially facing large firms. Here we stand 
thus at the crossroads with another important field in microeconomics, the analysis of 
firm behavior under risk and uncertainty. 
 
2.2. Firm behavior under risk and uncertainty. 
The second fields of literature this paper contributes to is the study of firms’ 
behavior under risk and uncertainty. In this study we are interested specifically in firms’ 
decision regarding insurance purchase. If corporations were perfectly risk-neutral agents 
and simply profit maximizer, insurance priced above actuarially fair rates should not be 
attractive to them. Still, firms, small and large, do purchase such insurance.  
One explanation is that corporations are required by law to buy some insurance 
(e.g. workers’ compensation insurance is required in all states of the Union but one, 
Texas). There might be also contractual obligations from a bank or bond covenant 
(Garven and MacMinn, 1993).  Aside from these requirements, a number of scholars 
have tried to develop a positive theory of corporate insurance demand. There might be 
some tax incentives since the tax code allows firms to deduct insurance premiums as 
business expenses (Main, 1983)7. Mayers and Smith (1982) and MacMinn (1987) argue 
that insurance is just another form of financing by firms and that it helps avoid the 
transaction costs of bankruptcy8. Indeed the probability of incurring these costs is 
lowered by shifting the firm’s exposure risk to the insurance company. In the specific 
case of large companies though, which are typically owned by a large number of 
stockholders, the degree of diversification of the assets can be so high that there would be 
no need for insurance (Mayers and Smith, 1982). If this is the case, then we should see 
larger companies being less likely to buy standard or terrorism coverage.  
Still, another way to look at corporate behavior has been suggested by Grennwald 
and Stiglitz (1990, 1993) who show how the introduction of the risk of a significant cost 
of bankruptcy and the existence of incentive systems within the firm could lead firm 
                                                 
7 The finance literature on corporate hedging also find evidence that firms hedge to reduce tax liabilities; 
see Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993). 
8 Doherty (2000) proposes an alternative view to examine corporate demand for property insurance. 
Property insurance can viewed as an alternative financing instrument before and after damage occurred. In 
the same vein, Hau (2006) argues that even a risk-neutral company might obtain property insurance as an 
alternative instrument to provide liquidity in the case of business interruptions and accompanied contract 
penalties.  
6 
 
managers to act in the name of the company in a risk-averse manner. Such behavior 
might be particularly relevant in the case of terrorism. For instance, managers of large 
and very well known companies might be more likely to buy insurance than those of 
smaller firms if they believe they are more vulnerable to attack. . That would be the case 
if they anticipate that terrorist organizations will view their corporation as an American 
symbol or trophy target. In the same vein, specific locations, such as the New York area 
where the two attacks perpetrated by international terrorist organizations on U.S. soil 
took place in 1993 and 2001 are legitimately viewed by many as a prime target; corporate 
demand there is likely to be higher than in the rest of the country. Managers of these 
companies would not want to be singled out in the aftermath of a terrorist attack as not 
having covered their company against such a potentially catastrophic risk. If this 
prediction is correct, then we should see larger companies being more likely to buy some 
terrorism coverage.  
Using the size of the company as a proxy for it being a trophy target and its 
capacity to self-insure and/or raise capital in the aftermath of a catastrophic loss,  our data 
allow us to test which of these opposing effects is more relevant for larger companies’ 
insurance decision. 
 To our knowledge, no empirical study on corporate demand for property 
insurance has been published on the U.S. market due to the lack of available data.9 
Regarding corporate demand for terrorism insurance in the U.S., Michel-Kerjan and 
Pedell (2006) provide the first study by comparing how much similar companies do pay 
for terrorism insurance in the U.S. versus Germany and the U.K., but their analysis is 
based on aggregate data so no econometric analysis were undertaken at a microeconomic 
level (we come back to some of these results in the discussion section). 
 The present paper extends their work by undertaking an econometric analysis of 
firm-level data.  Marsh & McLennan, one of the largest insurance brokers, provided us 
with company-level data on over 1,809 of their large clients headquartered in the U.S.  
for the year 2007. Before we discuss the data and econometric analyses in section 4, the 
next section provides some background information on the evolution of the U.S. 
terrorism insurance market over time and the operation of TRIA. 
 
3. BACKGROUND ON TRIA AND TERRORISM INSURANCE DEMAND 
 
3.1. Terror insurance markets before and immediately after 9/11 
The 1993 bombing of the WTC killed 6 people and caused $725 million in 
insured damages   Prior to 9/11 the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, which killed 168 
people, had been the most damaging terrorist attack on domestic soil, but the largest 
losses were to federal property and employees, and were covered by the government. As 
a result insurance losses from terrorism were viewed as so improbable that the risk was 
not explicitly mentioned in any standard policy and hence the rate for providing such 
                                                 
9 Yamori (1999), Hoyt and Khan (2000), Zo et al. (2003) and Regan and Hur (2007) provide some evidence 
but these analyzes all look at Asian markets (Japan, Taiwan, China and Korea). Further they all rely on 
insurance premiums as a proxy for the demand where we do measure the pure demand (actual  quantity of 
insurance purchased) of the 1,809 firms in our sample. 
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coverage to firms was never calculated. De facto terrorism was covered in most 
commercial insurance contracts. As Berkshire Chairman Warren Buffett said in his letter 
to shareholders: “we, and the rest of the industry, included coverage for terrorist acts in 
policies covering other risks, and received no additional premium for doing so.” 
  
Things radically changed in 2001. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
killed over 3,000 people10 from over 90 countries and injured more than 2,250 others. The 
attacks also inflicted damage currently estimated at nearly $80 billion, about $32.5 billion 
of which (2001 price) was covered by nearly 150 insurers and reinsurers worldwide 
(including $21 billion for damage and business interruption alone) (U.S. Treasury et al., 
2006). Private reinsurers, who covered a majority of these losses, decided to leave this 
market, letting insurers without protection. A few months after 9/11 insurers had now 
excluded terrorism from their policies in most states. Commercial enterprises thus found 
themselves in a very difficult situation, with insurance capacity extremely limited and 
prices very high.11  One year after 9/11, when national security had became the “number 
one” priority on the U.S. national and international agendas, the country’s commercial 
enterprises remained largely uninsured at home (Hale, 2002). If another large-scale attack 
had occurred at that time, the impact on the economy would have been much more serious 
than after 9/11. The economic losses would not have been spread over a large number of 
insurers and reinsurers worldwide but, in the absence of massive government funding, 
sustained by the firms themselves.  
The lack of availability of terrorism insurance shortly after the 9/11 attacks led to 
a call from some private sector groups for federal intervention. For example, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO, formally General Accounting Office) reported 
in 2002 that the construction and real estate industries claimed that the lack of available 
terrorism coverage delayed or prevented several projects from going forward because of 
concerns by lenders or investors (U.S. GAO, 2002).   
 
3.2. Terrorism insurance under TRIA 
In response to such concerns, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) 
was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bush on November 26, 2002.12  
This program was originally aimed at providing a three-year temporary measure to 
                                                 
10 This number represents victims of the attacks in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania as well as 
among teams of those providing emergency service. 
11 Consider the case of insuring Chicago’s O’Hare Airport. Prior to 9/11, the airport had $750 million of 
terrorist insurance coverage at an annual premium of $125,000 (an implicit probability of 1 in 4,300 if one 
disregards for simplicity additional administrative cost charged by the insurer). After the terrorist attacks 
insurers only offered the airport $150 million of coverage at an annual premium of $6.9 million (a revised 
implicit probability of 1 in 22; a 200-fold difference since the 9/11 attacks). The airport purchased this 
coverage and could not obtain any more (Jaffee and Russell, 2003). Another example is the Golden Gate 
Park in San Francisco, which was unable to obtain terrorism coverage; moreover, even its non-terrorism 
coverage was reduced from $125 million to $25 million—and the premiums for this reduced amount of 
protection increased from $500,000 in 2001 to $1.1 million in 2002 (Smetters, 2004). 
12 The complete version of the original Act can be downloaded at: http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/claims_process/program.shtml 
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increase the availability of risk coverage13, but the program has been renewed twice 
since. TRIA is now extended up to the end of 2014, but given the series of renewals in 
the past few years one might expect this program to be extended again in the future.14 
 TRIA operation can be somewhat complex and it is not the purpose of this paper 
to analyze it. Still there are features of TRIA that will be important for this analysis and 
also for potential policy implication of our results.  First, TRIA requires insurers to offer 
terrorism coverage to all their commercial clients (a legal “make available” 
requirement).15 These firms have the right to refuse this coverage unless it is mandated by 
state law, as in the case of workers’ compensation lines in most states.16  Second, loss 
sharing under TRIA is somewhat peculiar. The first layer is provided by insurers through 
a “deductible” they must assume. It is calculated as a percentage of the direct commercial 
property and casualty earned premiums of each insurer in the preceding year.17. The 
second layer up to $100 billion is the joint responsibility of the federal government and 
insurers. Specifically, the federal government is responsible for paying 85 percent18 of 
each insurer’s primary property-casualty losses during a given year above the applicable 
insurer deductible; the insurer covers the remaining 15 percent.  
The federal government does not receive any premium for providing this 
reinsurance coverage, but can recoup part of its payment post attack against all 
commercial enterprises in the country. Hence, the insurance premiums paid by a 
commercial firm for insurance coverage under TRIA today is much lower than it would 
be without the free up-front reinsurance provided by the government program. An 
important policy question that has been debated in the past few years is whether the 
federal government should continue to provide this type of free reinsurance or whether 
the market should provide all or part of this reinsurance.  So far the main counter-
argument has been that any businesses in the U.S. would drop their terrorism coverage 
because they would not been able to sustain an increase in price (which would happen if 
insurers are deprived from free federal reinsurance). Nevertheless, no one has provided 
empirical evidence to validate this assertion. Our results shall provide important insights 
to this debate.   
                                                 
13 U.S. Congress (2002). Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. HR 3210. Washington, DC, November 26. 
14 Many federal programs established in the past have actually benefited from quasi-systematic renewal 
since they were first established; that is true of the Price Anderson Act first passed in 1957 to partially 
indemnify the nuclear industry against liability claims arising from nuclear incidents, of the National Flood 
Insurance Program established in 1968 for covering against flood, and of the California Earthquake 
Authority created in 1996 to provide insurance against earthquakes.   
15 Residential coverage is not included in this program 
16 Workers’ compensation coverage is mandatory for a large majority of employers in all states other than 
Texas, where it is optional. Employers must either purchase insurance or qualify to self-insure. Workers’ 
compensation laws do not permit employers or insurers to exclude coverage for worker injuries caused by 
terrorism. 
17 The percentage increases sharply over time: 7 percent in 2003, 10 percent in 2004, 15 percent in 2005, 
17.5 percent in 2006 and 20 percent in 2007. As illustrative figures, a Morgan Stanley study estimates that 
AIG’s 2004 deductible was $2.7 billion. Other insurers, such as Travelers, ACE, Chubb and Berkshire had 
lower 2004 deductibles: $928 million, $743 million, $600 million and $200 million, respectively (Morgan 
Stanley, 2004).  According to analysis we undertook as part of the Wharton Risk Center (2005) study, 
projections indicated that deductibles would have more than doubled in real terms by 2008.  
18 Before 2007 it was 90 percent. 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Our empirical analysis of the corporate demand for catastrophe insurance consists 
of two parts. We first examine the drivers of the decision to purchase coverage against 
terrorism. Second, among companies that have terrorism insurance, we analyze the 
determinants of the quantity of terrorism coverage purchased under TRIA. As a reference 
point, we compare these results with companies’ decisions as to whether to purchase 
standard property insurance and how much such coverage they have. In addition, we try 
to estimate regional differences between the New York metropolitan area and the rest of 
the country. 
  
4.1. Data and statistics summary 
 
We accessed data from Marsh on the property insurance contracts they brokered 
to their clients in 2007.  Company identities are kept anonymous through the use of 
random ID numbers designed specifically for this study. Data was reported through an 
internal Internet form completed by brokers of the different Marsh offices in the U.S.  We 
assume that any broker or office idiosyncrasies were randomly distributed across the 
dataset.   
 The original data included 1,884 companies.  We removed erroneous entries from 
the dataset, as well as a few companies that purchased stand-alone terrorism coverage 
only (coverage of all assets of the company worldwide, which is independent of TRIA 
and negotiated at a world level by the corporation). We also removed several companies 
with total insured value lower than $1 million. We were left with 1,808 companies, 1,064 
of which had purchased some type of terrorism insurance in conjunction with their 
normal property insurance; that is a market penetration of 59 percent19. For 628 of these 
1,066 companies we have observations for all relevant dependent and explanatory 
variables. 
 
The data does not include exact information on the physical location of all the 
company’s assets but only the Marsh office which brokered their policy (typically in the 
same location that the headquarters of the company); we use this as the proxy for 
location. Indeed, each individual contract covered multiple locations for a single 
company and we assume that the amount of locations per company is randomly 
distributed across our data set. Marsh divided their offices into the nine major regions, 
each combining a number of states.20    
                                                 
19 Market penetration/take=up rate is defined as the fraction of companies that have a terrorism insurance 
policy, and not the amount of assets insured against terrorism over the total amount of assets. These data 
are consistent with the evolution of market penetration in the past few years. Data for previous years show 
a significant and fairly continuous increase of the take-up rate, from 23 percent in the second quarter of 
2003, 45 percent in 2004, 56 percent in 2005, and 60 percent in 2006.  
20 Central Midwest – Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Wisconsin; Mid-Atlantic – District of 
Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Philadelphia), Virginia; New York Metro – New Jersey 
(Morristown), New York (New York), Connecticut (Norwalk); Northeast – Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
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Firms in the dataset can be divided into 21 industry sectors.21 Table 2 shows the 
distribution of companies within the full samples across these different industry sectors.22 
It also shows the number of companies with TRIA insurance. Table 3 shows the same 
data but for the New York metropolitan area only. As one can see from these two tables, 
both samples feature a similar distribution of companies across industries but, as 
expected, they differ in terms of market penetration of terrorism insurance (59 percent for 
the full sample, 73 percent for the New York metro).  
 
[ INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
In the first step of our econometric analysis we try to identify variables that have 
an effect on a company’s decision to purchase terrorism insurance or not (Probit model). 
Therefore, we construct a dummy variable that simply indicates whether a company has 
some TRIA terrorism coverage or not, Terrorism (Yes/No). In our full sample, about 59 
percent of companies have terrorism coverage (see Table 2).  The average size of 
companies in our sample is measured by assets that are covered under property insurance; 
that is the total insured value (“TIV” hereafter). The mean of the distribution is a TIV of 
$1.75 billion (median of $2.95 billion).  We also have information for the full sample as 
to whether a company has some form of insurance against three types of natural hazards 
(wind/hurricane, earthquake, and flood). We converted information on natural hazard 
limits and deductibles into binary yes/no variables. 46 percent of our samples have wind 
coverage, 58 percent have earthquake coverage and 74 percent have flood coverage. This 
is an interesting statistics in itself given that wind coverage is often required by banks to 
protect their mortgage. Still, a largest proportion of firms in our sample have some type 
of quake insurance, which is typically not required.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
In the second part of the analysis we look at the specific subsample of companies 
that have terrorism coverage to estimate the quantity of insurance they purchased. We 
construct the ratio maximum compensation they can receive from their insurers for 
terrorism (limit on the policy) divided by the total policy limit of the company (Cover 
                                                                                                                                                 
Maine, New York (Rochester, Syracuse), Rhode Island; South Central – Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; 
Southeast – Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia; Southwest – 
Arizona, California (Los Angeles, Newport Beach, and San Diego); Upper Midwest – Kentucky, Michigan, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh); West – Alaska, California (San Francisco, San Jose), Colorado, Hawaii, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington. Note that California, New York, and Pennsylvania include offices that are in 
multiple regions.  The specific locations are included in parentheses. 
21 Agriculture, Construction & Design Firms, Distribution, Education, Financial Institutions, Food & 
Beverages, Healthcare, Hospitality & Gaming, Manufacturing, Media, Mining, Pharmaceutical, Power & 
Utilities, Public Entities, Real Estate, Retail/Wholesale, Services, Technology, Telecomm and  
Transportation[0]. 
22 Here also it is also interesting to observe how this take-up rate has evolved in recent years by specific 
industry sectors. Between 2003 and 2007, take-up rates in all sectors jumped from a 10-30 percent to a 50-
80 percent range. Financial institutions, education, health care and real estate are the leading sectors in 
terms of take-up rate (in the 75-85 percent range today compared to 25-30 percent in 2003); manufacturing, 
food and beverage, and retail, the lowest (nearly 50 percent today compared to 20-30 percent in 2003).  
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Tria). We construct the same variable for property insurance (Cover_Property); 
Property_TIV indicates the total value of all the assets covered under the insurance 
contract, which reflects the size of the company. For this part of the analysis we use 
information on the total premium paid by the company for terrorism insurance 
(Premium_TRIA) and for property insurance (Premium_Property). Statistics on these 
variables are reported in Table 5 and Table 6 (the whole sample and New York Metro 
only, respectively). We also report in these two tables the premium paid by these 
companies per $1000 of coverage for property coverage and for terrorism coverage.  
 
The third part of our analysis consists of estimating the coefficients of interest for 
a subsample of companies located in the New York Metro area and comparing them to 
the rest of the country. A quick glimpse at the data in Table 6 reveals that firms in this 
region are on average twice as large (measured by their TIV) and also that the average 
degree of property and terrorism coverage there (44.1 percent and 39.6 percent) is smaller 
than in the national sample (54.8 percent  and 48.0 percent). Companies in the New York 
Metro area pay a larger premium for terrorism coverage (both in absolute value--
$420,687-- and per $1,000 of coverage, $1.39) compared to the national data ($111,963 
and 59 cents, respectively). More surprisingly, we find this also to be the case for 
standard property coverage..  On average firms in the New York Metro pay $2.2 million 
for property insurance and $6.14 per $1,000 of coverage (versus $1.24 million and $4.85 
in our national sample, respectively). One reason for that might be related to the high 
number of financial service companies located in this area for which business interruption 
(included in the standard property coverage) could be particularly expensive23. 
 
 
 [ INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
  
4.2.Empirical strategy 
 
 
The empirical analysis is complicated by three major issues. First, there is the 
bounded nature of the dependent variables (Cover_Tria and Cover_Property are always 
between 0 and 1) as well as the fact that many of our observations are concentrated at the 
upper boundary. Applying a standard OLS regression or an OLS regression with non-
linear transformation of the explanatory variable does not guarantee that the predicted 
results lie within the range of the independent variable’s interval. Papke and Wooldridge 
(1995) developed a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE hereafter) to obtain 
robust results in that case.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 We thank John Rand for his insight here. 
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The functional form is as follows: 
 
   ( ) ( )γijrijrijr ZhZCOVERE =|           (1) 
COVER in (1) represents the degree of insurance coverage for terrorism and property 
insurance, Z is a vector of covariates, h is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) and γ 
is a K x 1 vector of the coefficients to be estimated. 
The parameters in equation (1) are estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimated via the following Bernoulli log-likelihood function: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]γγγ ijrijrijrijr ZhCOVERZhCOVERL −−+= 1log1log   (2) 
 
 
The second econometric issue derives from the fact that our sample might not be 
random. The dataset we have received from Marsh contains a portfolio of 1,884 “large” 
companies. There could be a systematic bias in the decision which companies enter the 
portfolio. In addition, the decision on the amount of coverage is a decision made by each 
company and might be driven by unobserved characteristics we cannot control for.  
Therefore, the subsample of those companies that do have terrorism insurance might be a 
self-selected sample and not a random sample. We apply a two stage approach based on 
the work by Heckman (1976) that has already been used by Zou et al. (2003) to estimate 
the corporate demand for property insurance of Chinese companies. Simply excluding the 
companies that do not have terrorism insurance would result in biased estimates.  
In order to overcome these possible problems, we apply the Heckman 
methodology, which tackles these issues by reflecting the self-selection process in the 
first stage and also assumes that the probability of a company buying terrorism insurance 
has an influence on the degree of coverage in the second stage. This approach is the only 
consistent estimator given the distribution of our company sample. 
 
In the first stage we apply a probit estimate with the following functional form: 
 ( ) ( )( )ijrijrijrijr VTIVLNgXYP ,|1 ==                                  (3) 
 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 for companies that have a 
terrorism insurance policy and equal to 0 otherwise. g is the cumulative distribution 
function.    
LN(TIVijr) in equation (3) is the natural logarithm of the total insured value of 
company i in industry j and region r; this variable serves as an empirical proxy for the 
size of the company. We use the natural logarithm in order to attenuate the effects of the 
very large number. The expectations on the sign of this size variable are ambiguous. On 
the one hand, as discussed above, larger companies are supposedly more able to diversify 
their risks. As a result they should be less likely to buy insurance than small firms. This 
suggests a negative sign.  On the other hand, larger companies are a more visible (if not 
attractive) target for terrorist groups who seek to inflict major economic disruption and to 
impose fear on a large number of people (idea of trophy target we discussed earlier). 
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Because of that, larger companies might be more likely to buy terrorism coverage and 
more likely to accept a higher cost of coverage as well. This suggests a positive sign. It is 
a priori not clear which one will be the most important effect.    
Vijr is a vector including various empirical proxies for a company’s attitude 
toward risks (measured here by degree of coverage for property) and specific attitude 
toward low probability-high-loss events (e.g. natural hazard insurance). For the latter, a 
dummy variable has been constructed that switches to 1 if there is either information on 
the premium, deductible or limit in one of the natural hazard categories (wind/hurricane, 
earthquake and flood) indicating that the firm has protected itself against these hazards 
and equals 0 otherwise (no natural catastrophe insurance reported). This process has been 
repeated for each individual natural hazard in order to construct hazard-specific dummies 
as well. These hazard dummies serve as the selection variables in the first stage 
regression.  
 
The predicted value Ŷijr from the first stage is then used to calculate the inverse 
mills ratio λ24. This ratio measures the likelihood that a company has some terrorism 
coverage. The traditional Heckman approach includes λ as an additional regressor in the 
second stage specification and applies OLS. Thus, the estimation function of the degree 
of coverage is conditioned on the selection function of the first stage. 
 
ijrijrijr ZCOVER ελβββ +++= 321                   (4) 
  
COVER represents the degree of insurance coverage for terrorism and property 
insurance. It is calculated by dividing the limit of the TRIA policy by the company TIV 
and by dividing the limit of the property policy over TIV, respectively.  Z is a vector of 
explanatory variables including, once again, the natural logarithm of the total insured 
value of the company, LN(TIV), the natural logarithm of the ratio premium over limit, 
LN(Premium/Limit), and a “New York Metro”-dummy that switches to 1 if the company 
is located in the New York Metro area and is 0 otherwise.  
 
In contrast to the first stage probit-estimates, we expect company size to have a 
negative sign (given that they buy insurance, larger firms buy proportionally less 
coverage than small ones). This relates to the suggestions made in the literature discussed 
in section 2. Another reason is that it might be more difficult for large firms to find 
enough insurance capacity for very high layers of coverage or, in other words, the cost 
for that type of coverage might be seen as too high. The analysis of our data provides 
insights as to whether there is such a difference in insurance cost for different firm sizes.  
 
The steps in the second stage of our econometric analysis are performed for terrorism 
insurance demand and property insurance demand separately. Controlling for the first-
stage sample selection identifies the exact same sample of companies. This allows a 
direct comparison between the coefficients estimated in the terrorism insurance demand 
regression and in the property insurance demand one.   
                                                 
24 The inverse Mill’s ratio is calculated by dividing the probability density function by the cumulative 
distribution function. 
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Differences in  the demand for terrorism insurance and for property insurance as a 
function of company size might either be explained by the fact that terrorism is a 
catastrophic risk and some managers in charge of buying insurance in firms tend to 
overreact when others think simply it will not happen to them.  There is no way we can 
determine how managers reacted to this risk without interviewing the relevant decision 
makers.  
Differences in price can be related to two factors. First, terrorism insurance in the 
U.S. is subsidized by the federal government; furthermore six years after 9/11 without 
any attack on U.S. soil, the market has softened price has significantly decreased 
compared to where it was when TRIA was enacted in 2002. Our sample hence consists of 
large companies that face relatively “cheap” insurance compared to what it was after 
TRIA was passed. . Second, there might still be companies (or their managers) that want 
to be covered at all costs. Based on these arguments we expect the demand for property 
insurance to be more price elastic than the demand for terrorism insurance.  
 
The final part of our empirical analysis tries to shed more light on the drivers that 
might explain differences in the price elasticity between terrorism and property insurance. 
Apart from the comparison between different types of insurance, we also make an 
attempt to compare corporate demand for insurance between different regions of the 
country. Given its history with terrorist events, we design a subsample that contains only 
companies with their headquarters in New York and compare the demand for property 
and terrorism insurance with all other regions. Given that the two attacks perpetrated by 
international terrorist organizations in the U.S. were in New York City, there is a general 
perception that the New York metropolitan area is at higher risk than any other part of the 
country. As pointed out above,  New York is also the world’s leading financial center 
with a high concentration of firms and industries (and thus assets) that are very sensitive 
to the threats posed from terrorist attacks (idea of trophy target). For all these reasons, it 
is also important in our analysis to isolate a possible “New York effect” from other 
effects such as company size or industry. We expect the differences in price elasticities 
between terrorism and property insurance to be larger in New York than in the rest of the 
country. 
The third econometric complication emerges from a potential endogeneous 
relationship between the premium and the degree of coverage. For example, we do not 
have any information about the negotiation process between the insurer and the insured; 
the premium and the degree of coverage might be influenced simultaneously by omitted 
variables. We try to circumvent this problem by applying an instrumental variable 
estimator. Our instruments for the insurance premium are dummy variables for each 
insurance company. The premium offered by each supplier depends on insurance 
company specific effects such as the portfolio or the rating.  
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4.3 Regression results and discussion 
 
National Sample---We first discuss the results from the quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimator (QMLE) estimates. Table 7 summarizes the results for the demand for terrorism 
insurance as well as property insurance for the full sample as well as the New York and 
the remaining regions subsamples. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
 
The coefficient of TIV is negative and highly significant, indicating that larger companies 
have on average a lower degree of coverage than smaller firms. Comparing the 
coefficients of the TIV shows that there are almost no differences in the effect of 
company size between terrorism and property insurance. In both cases, we find that 
among firms that have purchased terrorism coverage, larger companies tend to have a 
lower coverage of their asset (limit over TIV).  
This is certainly the case because the cost of coverage is much higher for high 
limit. As illustrated in Figure 1, the cost of terrorism coverage increases with the total 
amount of coverage purchased but in a very different way below and above a $1 billion 
limit. Below this threshold, the cost per $1,000 of coverage is about the same for a 100 
million dollar limit or a 1 billion dollar limit. But this cost increases sharply above 1 
billion dollars as firms buy a higher limit. A company with a limit between 500 million 
dollars and one billion dollars pays on average $0.3 per $1,000 of coverage nationwide; 
but a company pays on average $0.9 per $1,000 if it buys a limit between 1 and 5 billion 
dollars; above 5 billion, the cost increases to $1.8. This difference is even more important 
when we distinguish firms in the New York Metropolitan area from those in the rest of 
the country (see Figure 1). These differences in price certainly reflect both the limited 
capacity available to cover very large assets and the expensive cost of capital associated 
with covering those (for very high layers of coverage, the cost of capital alone can be 
several times the expected loss). For higher layers of coverage, the insurer is also more 
likely to suffer catastrophe loss in the case of large-scale attack, thus asking a higher 
marginal cost of coverage to protect against bankruptcy risk.  
 
  
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Results on price elasticity are in the second row in Table 7. Comparing the 
estimates for terror insurance and for property insurance we can see that the demand for 
terrorism insurance is less price elastic (-0.191 versus -0.316). This means that a price 
increase of 10 percent will decrease the quantity of property insurance purchased by 3.16 
percent but the quantity of terrorism insurance only by 1.91 percent (i.e. 65 percent more 
for property than for terrorism insurance). 
The first robustness check consisted of the application of a Heckman-Sample 
selection model. The results for the full sample in Table 8 reveals that our results are 
robust even after controlling for possible sample selection bias. The signs and 
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significance of both, the TIV and the premium variable are unchanged for the terrorism 
insurance estimates as well as the property insurance estimates. The size of the 
coefficients only changes marginally. In comparison to the QMLE estimates, the price 
elasticity of terrorism insurance is now -0.126 and for property insurance it is -0.209. The 
relative difference between the two coefficients stays unchanged (66 percent more for 
property than for terrorism insurance). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
In the next step we applied an IV-estimator in order to control for a possible 
endogeneity bias. The results are summarized in Table 9.  Once again, the estimates are 
robust and the sign, size and significance of the coefficients does not significantly change 
(relative catastrophe price elasticity is slightly higher- -74 pecent--in comparison to the 
QMLE and the Heckman estimates). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
The New York Metro Effect -- The second set of terrorism demand regressions focus on 
the comparison between the New York Metropolitan subsample and the rest of the 
country (Tables 7, 8 and 9). The decreasing effect of company size on terrorism insurance 
is slightly larger in New York than in other regions.  
As expected, the corporate demand for terrorism insurance is less elastic in New 
York than it is in all other regions (about half). Also the difference in the price elasticity 
between terrorism and property insurance within the New York sample (153 percent) is 
larger than in the rest of the country (45 percent). Given that the average premium for 
terrorism insurance is about two times higher in New York Metro than in the rest of the 
country, these results indicate that corporations in this specific region are much more 
sensitive to terrorism risks and their demand for coverage is less responsive to small price 
changes25. These results stay robust for the Heckman and the IV-estimates (see Tables 8 
and 9). 
Table 10 provides a summary of the differences in price elasticity between 
terrorism and property insurance among different samples and estimators. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Insurance premiums and implicit perceived probability—One major difficulty in 
economics of security in general and terrorism insurance markets in particular is that it is 
almost impossible to provide a robust distribution of probability for terrorist attacks on 
                                                 
25 It is important to keep in mind here that this is the price elasticity in a terrorism insurance market that has 
considerably softened in the past few years. According to a Marsh survey of over 1,600 client firms in the 
U.S., the median terrorism rate (ratio of terror premium to total insured value) fell from 0.0057 percent in 
2004 to 0.0042 percent  in 2005, indicating a decline of the average cost of terrorism coverage of over 25 
percent  (Marsh 2006).  This trend continued in 2006 with a median rate decreased to 0.0038 percent. 
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U.S. soil. Given this difficulty impossibility, how can one determine the expected 
losses—and thus the “right” price? Is $592,000 in TRIA premium paid by a company to 
purchase $1 billion terror limit on its coverage an expensive deal, or a bargain? (see 
Table 5). This amount increases to $1.36 million in premium for firms with the same $1 
billion terror limit but in the New York Metropolitan area (Table 6). Is it justified? It is 
hard to tell for sure. 
One way to interpret these numbers is to look as a reference point at what the 
company pays for standard property insurance.  We find cost of insurance for standard 
property coverage to be nearly eight times higher than for the same quantity of terrorism 
coverage in the national sample. One possible reading of these results in Tables 5 and 6, 
assuming 2007 data remain the same today, is that given the current design of TRIA and 
market prices, firms in the U.S. see themselves as having a 1-in-206 chance to trigger 
their standard property limit this year (they pay $4.848 per $1000 of property coverage), 
versus a 1-in-1690 chance to trigger their terrorism limit ($0.592 per $1,000 of terror 
coverage) (Table 5)26.  When we look at New York Metro only (Table 6), this difference 
is reduced by half: the cost of insurance for standard property coverage is nearly four 
times higher than for the same quantity of terrorism coverage. Using similar implicit 
probability reasoning, U.S. firms operating in the New York Metro area see themselves 
as having a 1-in-160 chance to trigger their standard property limit ($6.149 per $1,000 of 
coverage) versus a 1-in-730 chance to trigger their terrorism limit ($1.362 per $1,000 of 
terror coverage).  
Another way to look at the price of TRIA coverage is to compare it with what 
firms with similar characteristics are paying in other countries. The data reveal that 
corporate terrorism insurance has become extremely inexpensive in the United States 
compared to what it is in Europe. In a companion study we found that on average, large 
firms in the U.S. were paying two or three times less for terrorism insurance than what 
they were paying in Germany for the same amount of coverage.  And even for financial 
institutions, which are typically located in places considered at higher risk, we found that 
in 2006, U.S. financial institutions were paying the same price as their German 
counterparts were paying in Germany (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2006). Unless one 
believes that the risk of large terrorist attacks has become similar or even much higher in 
Germany than it is in the U.S., which is quite unlikely, one should conclude that under 
current market conditions, terrorism insurance has become largely underpriced in the 
U.S27.  
 
                                                 
26 As prices convey information, one shall consider price insurers are charging corporations for terrorism 
insurance as an indicator of the associated implicit probability. We recognize that there are limitations to 
this exercise given that insurers should also include other elements in their pricing than the sole expected 
loss (administrative costs of managing the policies, marketing them and assessing claims as well as the cost 
of capital required to cover large firms). Moreover, under the current market conditions, a large part of the 
exposure is reinsured free of charge by the federal government. In other words, the cost that corporations 
are paying today is below what they would have to pay for the same coverage if this reinsurance were 
provided by the private reinsurance market. Still, we believe price contain information on risk belief. 
27 The alternative is that terrorism is simply overpriced in Germany. Still data on the British and French 
terrorism insurance markets reveal that the cost of terrorism in these two other countries is aligned with (if 
not even higher than) what it is in Germany (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2006).  
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SECTION 5. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
5.1. On corporate demand for insurance 
Important contributions have been made in the past two decades that helped better 
explain decisions made by corporations as to how they decide to protect their assets 
against all sorts of risks they face, and the role that insurance can play in that regard. 
Somewhat surprisingly these remain mainly theoretical contributions. Microeconomic 
analysis of demand for insurance is much more developed for individual decision than for 
corporations (Grace et al, 2003; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). Part of the 
explanation for the lack of empirical work to test these theories has been that while there 
is large data available on the homeowners insurance market (for instance, from the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners), data on a large number of 
corporations is difficult to access. Competition among firms and anti-trust law make it 
often even more difficult for the research community to access a large enough data 
sample to undertake substantial microeconomic analysis on corporate insurance decision. 
Thanks to a unique cooperation with Marsh McLennan, we have been able to 
provide the first analysis of U.S. corporate demand for insurance and compare firms’ 
behavior for catastrophe and non-catastrophe risks, using terrorism threat as an 
illustration. Looking specifically at over 1,800 large companies across regions and 
industry sectors that are headquartered in the U.S., we conclude that larger companies are 
more likely to purchase terrorism coverage; still among those who have terrorism 
insurance, corporate behavior for standard property and terror coverage does not 
significantly differ with size. This might be the case because firms tend to purchase a 
limit for terrorism insurance close to what they have for standard property—we find that 
80 percent of our sample does.   Still, controlling for regional effects and industry sectors, 
we find that the demand functions have a different price elasticity: demand for standard 
property is significantly more elastic28. We also test for a possible New York 
Metropolitan effect: given that prices for terrorism coverage are much higher in the New 
York metro area than in the rest of the country, do we still see differences in price 
elasticity? Our results show that to remain the case: firms exhibit a demand function for 
terrorism coverage in the rest of the country that is two times more price elastic than it is 
in the New York metro.   
 
5.2. Policy implications for government intervention in market for catastrophes 
In addition to contributing to the literature on corporate demand for insurance, 
these empirical results also provide input to the growing literature on economics of 
national security. After Al Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, the insurance and 
reinsurance markets failed to provide adequate coverage to millions of firms operating in 
the U.S. and other OECD countries because terrorism became almost overnight 
uninsurable by the private sector alone. As in several European countries, the U.S. federal 
government intervened in the market to assure firms had access to sufficient terrorism 
                                                 
28 This result is opposite to the seminal study by Grace et al. (2003) on residents in New York, which finds 
that demand for property insurance is less price elastic than for catastrophe risks (hurricanes). 
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coverage and that coverage would be available at an affordable price. In the US, TRIA 
was passed in 2002 and was renewed twice since until December 2014.  
One important policy goal of TRIA was to make sure terrorism insurance would 
be accessible to many corporations that would need it. Data show that market penetration 
has significantly increased over the first few years of the implementation of TRIA to 
reach a plateau at about 60 percent.  In that sense, federal intervention into this market 
has reached its goal: a majority of the companies we studied have benefited from TRIA 
and bought coverage.  
Still, we find that 4 out of 10 of these companies have decided not to buy that 
coverage.  There might be several reasons for that. First, while our analysis shows that 
the demand for terrorism insurance is pretty inelastic it also shows that smaller 
companies are more likely not to buy insurance. This might be because they think they 
are not at risk (it will not happen to us) or because they have limited resources to spend 
on other insurance than the standard property coverage, or both. Second, a company that 
does not buy TRIA-type terrorism insurance is still effectively covered against terrorism 
for workers’ compensation in all states but Texas and for fire following an attack in half 
the states. Also, current terrorism insurance policies typically do not cover against attacks 
using weapons of mass destruction (so-called CBRN; chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear), which are viewed by many as the main source of potential mega-
catastrophe. This terrorism coverage might not be a great arrangement for some of these 
companies.    Third, given how federal government has intervened after recent disasters 
(rescuing the airlines after 9/11 and banks after the subprime crisis), some might simply 
expect the federal government to intervene after the next big disasters (although our data 
cannot validate this assumption).   
Another important element of federal intervention in this terrorism insurance 
market is that TRIA requires insurers to offer the same limit on the coverage for terrorism 
risk as for standard property; firms could then decide to buy that quantity of insurance, 
less or more (if the insurer is willing to). Our results show that the way the government 
designed this program had an important impact on firm’s behavior. Indeed, 80 percent of 
the firsm in our sample bought the same quantity of insurance for terrorism that they had 
for standard property coverage. This “anchoring” effect calls for more research.   
Finally, as we discussed, under TRIA the government provides insurers with free 
federal reinsurance. Whether the government should continue to provide this free service 
to corporations or whether private insurers and reinsurers could re-enter this market by 
providing coverage for some layer currently covered by the government has been up for 
debate since the inception of the program. It has been said that doing so would 
immediately increase the price of coverage firms would have to pay and result in a 
significant drop in coverage, thus make the country more vulnerable economically.  
Our results do not support this statement; our determination of price elasticity 
indicates that for any extra 10 percent firms would be asked to pay for terrorism they 
would decrease their coverage by only about 1 percent. Even for firms located in the New 
York Metropolitan area, which are likely to be impacted the most by a market-based 
reinsurance solution, this drop would be only of 0.79 percent for a 10 percent increase in 
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price. There seems to be flexibility for policymakers to favor some market-based 
solutions here that has not been contemplated.  
 
The results of our analysis should be regarded as a starting point for future 
research in this field. Given the data constraints, we were only able to deal with a limited 
number of issues raised by the theoretical literature on corporate demand for insurance. 
Apart from industry and location we were only able to estimate the effect of company 
size on demand for terrorism insurance. For future work, it would be useful to access 
more detailed corporate information on liquidity, access to short term credit or decision 
structures within the company (including incentive systems in place) in order to provide a 
comparative analysis of how these other characteristics affect corporate demand for 
property and terrorism insurance. It would also be useful to extend our analysis to other 
catastrophic risks than terrorism and also to countries with different institutional settings 
and different degree of government involvement in insurance markets, which might also 
influence how large companies operating there use insurance. 
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TABLE 1.  
THE 10 MOST COSTLY TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TERMS OF INSURED PROPERTY LOSSES. 1970-2001 
Insured property 
US$ million, indexed to 2001 
(excluding liability and life) 
Event Injured Fatalities Date Location 
907 Bomb explodes near 
NatWest tower (City) 
54 1 24 Apr. 93 UK (London) 
744 Explosion of IRA car 
bomb near shopping mall 
228 0 15 Jun. 96 UK 
(Manchester) 
725 Bomb explodes in garage 
of World Trade Center 
1,000 6 26 Feb. 93 USA (New 
York) 
671 Bomb explodes in 
financial district 
91 3 10 Apr. 92 UK (London) 
398 Rebels destroy 3 airliners, 
8 military aircraft and 
heavily damage 3 civilian 
aircraft 
15 20 24 Jul. 01 
 
Sri Lanka / 
Colombo Airport 
259 IRA bomb attack in South 
Key Docklands 
100 2 09 Feb. 96 
 
UK (London) 
145 Truck bomb attack on 
government building in 
Oklahoma City 
467 166 19 Apr. 95 USA  
(Oklahoma City) 
138 PanAm Boeing 747 
crashes due to bomb 
0 270 21 Dec. 88 
 
UK (Lockerbie) 
 
127 Hijacked Swissair DC-8, 
TWA Boeing 707 and 
BOAC VC-10 dynamited 
0 0 12 Sep.70 
 
Jordan (Zerqa) 
 
111 Hijacked PanAm B-747 
dynamited 
0 0 06 Sep 1970 Egypt (Cairo) 
Sources: Swiss Re (2002). Note: Starting in 1970 up to September 10, 2001. 
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TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND NUMBER OF COMPANIES WITH 
SOME TERRORISM INSURANCE – FULL SAMPLE OF 1808 COMPANIES 
Industry Firms  Proportion With terror insurance Proportion 
Agriculture 11 0.61% 3 27.27% 
Construction & Design 46 2.54% 23 50.00% 
Distribution 35 1.94% 19 54.29% 
Education 75 4.15% 55 73.33% 
Financial Institutions  78 4.31% 56 71.79% 
Food & Beverages 79 4.37% 40 50.63% 
Healthcare 156 8.63% 115 73.72% 
Hospitality & Gaming 84 4.65% 56 66.67% 
Manufacturing 452 25.00% 199 44.03% 
Media 46 2.54% 29 63.04% 
Mining 18 1.00% 3 16.67% 
Pharmaceutical 36 1.99% 20 55.56% 
Power & Utilities 105 5.81% 69 65.71% 
Public Entities 59 3.26% 35 59.32% 
Real Estate 124 6.86% 97 78.23% 
Retail & Wholesale 125 6.91% 70 56.00% 
Services 120 6.64% 76 63.33% 
Technology 68 3.76% 41 60.29% 
Telecomm 27 1.49% 17 62.96% 
Transportation 64 3.54% 41 64.06% 
 Total        1,808                            1,064  
 
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND NUMBER OF COMPANIES WITH 
SOME TERRORISM INSURANCE– NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA ONLY – 220 COMPANIES 
Industry Firms Proportion  With terror insurance 
         
Proportion 
Agriculture 0 0.0% 0 - 
Construction & Design 1 0.5% 1 100% 
Distribution 2 0.9% 1 50% 
Education 21 9.5% 20 95% 
Financial Institutions  17 7.7% 15 88% 
Food & Beverages 5 2.3% 4 80% 
Healthcare 10 4.5% 10 100% 
Hospitality & Gaming 9 4.1% 9 100% 
Manufacturing 47 21.4% 23 49% 
Media 13 5.9% 9 69% 
Mining 5 2.3% 1 20% 
Pharmaceutical 8 3.6% 4 50% 
Power & Utilities 5 2.3% 4 80% 
Public Entities 2 0.9% 2 100% 
Real Estate 17 7.7% 15 88% 
Retail & Wholesale 22 10.0% 14 64% 
Services 21 9.5% 15 71% 
Technology 7 3.2% 4 57% 
Telecomm 3 1.4% 2 67% 
Transportation 5 2.3% 3 60% 
 Total  220  156  
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TABLE 4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – FULL SAMPLE OF 1809 COMPANIES 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Terrorism (Yes/No) 1809 0.589 0.492 0 1 
Property TIV ($ million) 1808 1,750 5,780 1.03 93,200 
Wind Insurance 
(Yes/No) 
1809 0.462 0.499 0 1 
Quake Insurance 
(Yes/No) 
1809 0.579 0.494 0 1 
Flood Insurance 
(Yes/No) 
1809 0.740 0.439 0 1 
 
 
 
TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – COMPANIES WITH TRIA-TYPE COVERAGE – ALL REGIONS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Cover_Tria 628 0.480 0.376 0.002 1.000 
Cover_Property 628 0.548 0.365 0.008 1.000 
Property_TIV 
($million) 
628 1,970 5,970 1 93,221 
Premium TRIA ($) 628 111,963 400,815 21 5,877,503 
Premium Property ($) 628 1,238,668 2,503,894 2,106 29,731,212 
Premium per $1,000 of 
TRIA insurance ($) 
628 0.592 1.645 7.76E-04 22.195 
Premium per $1000 of 
property coverage ($) 
628 4.848 7.973 0.290 99.948 
 
 
TABLE 6. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – COMPANIES WITH TRIA-TYPE COVERAGE – NEW YORK 
METRO ONLY 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Cover Tria 92 0.396 0.368 0.003 1 
Cover Property 92 0.441 0.369 0.009 1 
Property TIV 
($million) 
92 4,330 1,180 1,630 93,221 
Premium_TRIA ($) 92 420,687 917,863 1,255 5,877,503 
Premium_Property ($) 92 2,287,739 3,741,100 16,140 29,731,212 
Premium per $1,000 of 
TRIA insurance ($) 
92 1.362 2.393 0.0048 13.049 
Premium per $1000 of 
property coverage ($) 
92 6.149 8.315 0.323 54.813 
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Figure 1: TRIA Premium per $1,000 Limit for Different Limit Sizes (from 100 million 
dollars uop to 5 billion dollars and above – Comparison Full Sample, New York Metro 
and other - Regions (Mean values in boxes) 
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TABLE 7: INSURANCE DEMAND FOR TERRORISM & PROPERTY INSURANCE – QUASI-MAXIMUM 
LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE (QMLE) 
 
 
Full Sample New York Other Regions 
 Terror Property Terror Property Terror Property 
ln(TIV) -0.170*** -0.175*** -0.170*** -0.152*** -0.179*** -0.178*** 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.035) (0.022) (0.013) (0.009) 
ln(Premium/Limit) -0.191*** -0.316*** -0.100*** -0.253*** -0.220*** -0.320*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.023) (0.057) (0.013) (0.015) 
Industry FEa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FEb Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 628 628 92 92 536 536 
Log Likelihood -222.877 -209.577 -29.775 -29.591 -187.128 -177.609 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are given in parenthesis.  
a Agriculture is the omitted industry dummy. bCentral Midwest is the omitted region dummy. 
29 
 
 
TABLE 8: INSURANCE DEMAND FOR TERRORISM & PROPERTY INSURANCE – HECKMAN SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
 
Full Sample New York Other Regions 
 
Terrorism Property Terrorism Property Terrorism Property 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
ln(TIV) 0.067** -0.105*** 0.069*** -0.100*** 0.074 -0.103*** 0.066 -0.086*** 0.070** -0.112*** 0.072** -0.102*** 
 (0.027) (0.009) (0.026) (0.008) (0.080) (0.027) (0.080) (0.025) (0.029) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009) 
ln(Premium/Limit)  -0.126***  -0.209***  -0.064**  -0.187***  -0.139***  -0.211*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.027)  (0.038)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Earthquake 
Insurance  
-0.361**  -0.436**  0.423  0.392  -0.632***  -0.665***  
 (0.154)  (0.182)  (0.434)  (0.387)  (0.214)  (0.216)  
Flood Insurance  0.003  0.127  0.957  0.895  0.077  0.180  
 (0.189)  (0.186)  (0.582)  (0.552)  (0.221)  (0.214)  
Λ  -0.102  -0.104**  0.232  0.318**  -0.109  -0.073 
  (0.065)  (0.045)  (0.152)  (0.161)  (0.064)  (0.055) 
Industry FEa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FEb Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 934 408 934 408 121 63 121 63 813 345 813 345 
Prob>χ2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
a Agriculture is the omitted industry dummy. bCentral Midwest is the omitted region dummy. 
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TABLE 9: INSURANCE DEMAND FOR TERRORISM & PROPERTY INSURANCE – IV-ESTIMATES 
 
 
Full Sample New York Other Regions 
 Terror Property Terror Property Terror Property 
ln(TIV) -0.104*** -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.075*** -0.108*** -0.110*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.027) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) 
ln(Premium/Limit) -0.123*** -0.214*** -0.086*** -0.284*** -0.129*** -0.208*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.027) (0.036) (0.011) (0.012) 
Industry FEa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FEb Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 628 628 92 92 536 536 
Anderson LR-stat 430.014*** 442.493*** 74.451*** 40.238*** 380.002*** 407.613*** 
Centered R² 0.604 0.708 0.584 0.654 0.624 0.705 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are given in parenthesis. Insurance company fixed effects (e.g. dummies) are 
used as instruments for ln(Premium/Limit). 
a Agriculture is the omitted industry dummy. bCentral Midwest is the omitted region dummy. 
 
 
TABLE 10: DIFFERENCES IN PRICE ELASTICITY OF CORPORATE DEMAND FOR 
INSURANCE FOR TERRORISM VERSUS PROPERTY INSURANCE AMONG DIFFERENT 
SAMPLES AND ESTIMATORS. 
Variable Full New York Other regions 
QMLE +65 % +153 % +45 % 
Heckman +66 %  +192 % +52 % 
IV +74 %  +230 % +61 % 
 
 
